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the program closes the gap in willingness to invest between high-
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Poverty creates salient financial needs that require immediate attention. Since
attention is limited (Kahneman, 2011), poverty effectively reallocates it to present
needs at the expense of consideration of future payoffs (Mullainathan and Shafir,
2013). Under certain conditions, such poverty-induced focus on the present has
been shown to be excessive (e.g. Lichand and Mani, 2020), impairing the quality
of decision-making and productivity among the poor (Kaur et al., 2021). In a
striking example, access to credit – tempting because of its present benefits, while
its costs are only in the future – can make the poor worse off than if credit were
unavailable (Shah, Shafir and Mullainathan, 2015). Investments in children have
the features of credit reversed: their costs are in the present, while their benefits
are only in the future. As such, paying too much attention to present needs is
likely to discourage poor parents from undertaking those investments, even when
they yield high returns.1 This paper tests this hypothesis.
Studying this question outside the lab is challenging. Merely comparing how
families of different socioeconomic status (SES) make investments in children
would confound several other differences across high- and low-SES families, such
as parents’ knowledge about investment returns – a key determinant of human
capital investments. To deal with this challenge, we resort to a lab-in-the-field
experiment that randomly assigns financial worries within a sample of 2,223 care-
givers of public high-school students in Brazil.
Concretely, we endow subjects with R$ 10 (about USD 3 in 2017, when the
study took place) in airtime credit in exchange for answering an automated phone
call. In that call, subjects are offered the opportunity to invest their endowment
in signing up to an educational program that sends weekly text messages (SMS)
with information about their child’s school life, throughout the remainder of the
school year. At the beginning of the call, we randomly assign subjects to financial
worries by resorting to a survey experiment – a technique popular in cognitive
psychology called priming, and increasingly used within Economics (e.g. Lichand
and Mani, 2020, and Kaur et al., 2021, in the context of poverty’s psychological
effects).2 The idea is that the priming allows researchers to emulate (for a short
period of time) the psychological effects of poverty that, in reality, capture poor
subject’s attention all the time. We prime parents by asking them what they
would do if their child’s school started charging a high amount for textbooks
and uniforms (R$ 400, about USD 130 and over 40% of the minimum wage at
the time), and that amount were due by the end of that month. Textbooks and
uniforms are typically provided at no cost for public school students in Brazil.
Following previous studies (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013), the control group is
asked a variation of the same question, in which the only difference is that schools
are said to charge a low amount instead (R$ 20, about USD 6.50 at the time).
1It is not only the case that the poor under-invest in children on average, but also that children’s
characteristics associated with higher returns do not systematically predict investments; see Kremer and
Glennerster (2011).
2See also Cohn et al. (2015), Gilad and Kliger (2008), Benjamin, Choi and Strickland (2010), Cohn,
Fehr and Goette (2013), and Callen et al. (2014), in the context of influences on economic preferences.
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Manipulation checks within a few minutes of the priming confirm that it makes
parents 15% more likely to worry significantly about coping with household bills.
Consistent with the psychological mechanism that it is designed to capture, the
effect of the priming is concentrated on low-SES parents: those are 32% more
likely to state that they are desperate about household bills relative to primed
high-SES parents.
Such experimental design features multiple advantages. First, we offer par-
ents the opportunity to invest in the SMS program immediately after financial
worries are made salient. This isolates the psychological effects of poverty on in-
vestment decisions, shutting down alternative mechanisms through which poverty
presumably affects decision-making.3 Second, using airtime credit as endowment
ensures liquidity constraints do not play a role. Since airtime is non-fungible (as,
in Brazil, it cannot be transferred or used for making purchases), subjects’ deci-
sion of whether to allocate it to the SMS program or not should be unaffected by
potential effects that the priming could have on planned spending outside of the
experiment. Third, we enforce parents’ investment decisions without allowing for
preference reversals in the future: parents’ decisions are actually implemented at
the end of the experiment, those who decide not to invest in the program have
no future opportunity of doing so, and their endowment is converted into airtime
credit – which they cannot transfer to the child or use to make other investments
outside of the experiment. That ensures commitment problems do not play a
role. As such, we can document the causal effects of financial worries among the
poor on a real investment in children’s human capital.
Documenting that those primed about financial worries invest differently than
others does not necessarily point to inefficiency; after all, the control group might
not invest optimally to start with. To deal with this challenge, we take advantage
of the fact that all our subjects participated in a previous Randomized Control
Trial (Bettinger et al., 2020) that evaluated the exact educational intervention we
offer in the context of our survey experiment. Using machine learning techniques
(Athey and Imbens, 2017), we can predict child-specific returns of investing on
that educational program, and then control for predicted returns or restrict at-
tention to the parents with the highest predicted returns – for whom it is much
easier to claim that investing in the SMS program should be optimal4 – when
analyzing the psychological effects of poverty on investment decisions.
We start by documenting that high-SES parents (those with a college educa-
tion) are much more likely to undertake the investment: in the control group of
our experiments, 48.2% of high-SES parents invest in the SMS program, while
only 31% of low-SES parents do so. Such gap is striking in the context of our
experiment, since liquidity constraints do not play a role. Among the many po-
tential reasons why low-SES parents might be less willing to invest relative to
3Examples include differential nutrition (Schofield, 2014), noise (Dean, 2019) or lack of sleep (Bessone
et al., 2020); see Schilbach, Schofield and Mullainathan (2016) for a comprehensive survey.
4At the 75th percentile of predicted returns, we estimate that the net present value of the investment
is nearly 350-fold that of the outside option; see Section I.C.
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high-SES ones, we document that the latter are better able to anticipate the ex-
perience of receiving messages from the school than the former in the absence
of prior experience with the program. In effect, being randomly assigned to the
SMS program in the RCT over the previous school year nearly closes the SES
investment gap.
Having said that, financial worries reopen 2/3 of that gap. Results stand even
upon restricting attention to parents with the highest predicted returns. Con-
sistent with the psychological mechanism of interest, the priming has no effect
on high-SES parents. This not only confirms the interpretation that priming
captures poverty’s psychological effects, but also rules out that the high fee en-
tertained in the priming leads parents to trust schools to a lesser extent than
those in the control group – what would decrease willingness to invest among all
primed parents. We also find that financial worries do not significantly decrease
investments among low-SES parents without prior experience with the program
(whose willingness to invest was already low), ruling out that the priming leads
poor parents to optimally cut down on other educational investments upon up-
dating beliefs about the costs of school uniforms, in case they took the priming
message literally.
We show that treatment effects are driven by attention misallocation. First, we
document that primed parents respond significantly more to small but immediate
returns. As part of the phone survey, we subject parents to audio versions of
attention, working memory and impulse-control tests, following Lichand and Mani
(2020). Those tests are incentivized: the 20% top-performers earn extra R$ 2
(about 0.70 USD), creating an opportunity for short-term rewards. In this type
of tasks, it has been shown that subjects display excessive focus on present needs,
particularly within the income range of our study participants (Lichand and Mani,
2020).5 Consistent with previous findings, we document that subjects primed
about financial worries perform significantly better in those tests (by about 1/3
the effect of college education on cognitive performance). The effect is largely
driven by low-SES families, consistent with the mechanism. Incidentally, this
result rules out that effects are merely driven by poverty-induced present-bias
Haushofer and Fehr (2014): in our cognitive tests, both effort and rewards are in
the present.
Second, we document that the effects of financial worries on investment de-
cisions are equivalent to those of responding to future returns as if they were
small. We test this hypothesis by randomizing parents to information about
child-specific returns of the SMS program, in advance of the survey experiment.
Half of our subjects are informed via text message about the predicted effect of
5Lichand and Mani (2020) documents that priming subjects to induce financial worries improves
cognitive performance within short-term incentivized tasks at the per capita income levels of our study
participants. Such global improvements in cognitive performance are also found by Kaur et al. (2021)
and Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir (2019). This is in contrast to early experiments (Mullainathan and
Shafir, 2013; Mani et al., 2013) that document that subjects primed about poverty perform worse in
cognitive tests.
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the program on their child’s absences, two days before the phone survey. Be-
cause we predict that the program decreased only a few absences even when it
significantly increased graduation rates, the informational intervention effectively
framed returns as if they were small. As a result, it decreased parents’ willingness
to invest on average, and especially so among low-SES participants – an effect
size statistically identical to that of financial worries.
We contribute to an active literature on the psychological consequences of
poverty. While there is increasing evidence that poverty impairs executive func-
tions, inducing individuals to focus on scarcity at hand at the expense of other
dimensions (Mani et al., 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Kaur et al., 2021; Lic-
hand and Mani, 2020), this is the first paper to document its effects on human
capital investments. Since educational achievement is directly consequential to
future earnings, we show first-hand that the psychological effects of poverty can
induce inefficient decisions with the potential to generate inter-temporal poverty
traps.
Poverty-induced attention misallocation may shed light on the puzzling low
take-up of preventive health care among the poor as soon as price is above zero,
particularly among parents whose children would benefit the most from such in-
vestments Kremer and Glennerster (2011). Beyond investments in children, this
mechanism might help rationalize the systematic misallocation of health invest-
ments in developing countries (such as Cohen, Dupas and Schaner, 2015, in the
context of malaria testing and treatment, or Bai et al., 2017, in the context of
demand for and usage of health insurance). More broadly, poverty-induced atten-
tion misallocation might also help understand why the poor often miss high-return
investment opportunities (from inefficient usage of fertilizer to under-adoption of
productive technologies), a central element to the agenda of behavioral develop-
ment economics (Kremer, Rao and Schilbach, 2019).
I. Background
This section describes the educational context in which our experiment takes
place in subsection I.A, followed by details about the SMS program parents have
the opportunity to invest on in subsection I.B. Last, subsection I.C summarizes
how we predict child-specific effects of the program and explains how such pre-
dictions map into returns on investment for each parent.
A. Education in São Paulo State
São Paulo is the wealthiest and most populous Brazilian State, and its educa-
tional system encompasses the largest number of students in the country. Accord-
ing to the 2017 Brazilian Educational Census, enrollment in the State amounted
to over 1.8 million high-school students. Among those, 659,984 were junior stu-
dents, 86% of which served by schools administered by the State. Despite being
a relatively wealthy State – accruing to 40% of country’s GDP –, São Paulo fea-
tures high inequality in access to education: public schools tend to serve students
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from disadvantaged backgrounds. In our sample, which comprises a subset of
parents of public school students in the State who took part in another study
the year before (Bettinger et al., 2020), nearly 50% earn less than 3 minimum
wages (about 900 USD as of September, 2017), within the income range of slum
dwellers in the State capital, and less than 12% are college educated. As such,
public school students tend to perform particularly poorly: in 2017, São Paulo
State’s middle-school students enrolled in the public system scored 4.9 out of 10
in the National Index for the Development of Basic Education (Ideb) – which
averages math and Portuguese standardized test scores, penalizing that average
by grade repetition rates –, falling short of its already extremely modest target
(5.0) for middle-school students in the State.
B. The SMS program
The educational program we offer parents in the context of our experiment
(Eduq+, powered by the Brazilian EdTech Movva) delivers nudges via text mes-
sages (SMS) twice a week, directly to caregivers’ cell phones. Inspired by READY4K!
(York, Loeb and Doss, 2019), sequences start with a motivating fact, followed by
a suggested activity (always non-curricular, as it is often the case that students’
educational achievement is higher than that of their parents in Brazilian public
schools); caregivers then receive an interactive message in the following week,
posing them a question linked to the activity suggested the week before; last,
a ‘growth’ message meant to highlight that following students’ school life more
closely should be routine concludes the sequence. Content is catered to students’
age group. In the case of our study sample, messages cover the challenges of
being a teenager and how caregivers can help navigate that difficult phase, the
importance of studying hard and of finishing high school, and issues linked to
career choice.
In the year prior to our study, Bettinger et al. (2020) documents through a
Randomized Control Trial that the SMS program increases attendance by 3 per-
centage points in math classes (about 3 extra classes within 6 months), improves
Math test scores by 0.09 standard deviation (as if treated students were about 1
extra quarter ahead in school), and increases middle-school graduation rates by 3
p.p. (decreasing the likelihood of grade repetition by roughly 1/3). Such effects
are documented for the same population as that of our study (see Section II.A).
C. Child-specific returns on investment
We are ultimately interested in whether financial worries among the poor lead
them to inefficiently invest in their children’s human capital. This is, however,
a challenging exercise: even if financial worries were randomly assigned, it is not
obvious whether parents should optimally invest or not.6
6In an online experiment, Burlacu et al. (2019) document that financial worries induce poor parents
to spend more on household necessities at the expense of investments in children, relative to the control
6 MONTH YEAR
To deal with that challenge, we take advantage of the prior RCT (Bettinger
et al., 2020), which allows predicting the causal effect of the program for each of
our study participants. With that, we can control flexibly for predicted returns
when estimating the impacts of financial worries on investment decisions, and
even restrict attention to those with the highest predicted returns – for whom it
is much easier to argue that investing in the program should be optimal.7
We predict heterogeneous treatment effects of the intervention evaluated in
Bettinger et al. (2020) to generate an objective measure of returns on investment
for each participant in our study. We focus on child-specific predicted impacts
of the program on the probability of grade promotion, because of a direct link
between educational achievement and future labor market returns. Following
Athey and Imbens (2017), we computed child-specific returns through causal
random forests (we present all details in Appendix B).
Higher educational attainment is associated with substantially higher future
wages: in the 2017 Brazilian Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra
de Domićılios, PNAD), the cross-sectional correlation between 1 additional year
in school and monthly earnings is R$ 135.76 (about 45 USD at the time; Brazilian
Institute for Geography and Statistics, 2017). Using that figure, we estimate that
the expected present value of the investment would be 5-fold that of the outside
option even at the 25th percentile of predicted returns, and nearly 350-fold at the
75th percentile.8
II. Empirical strategy
This section starts by describing our sample in subsection II.A, followed by
details on the three experiments that we combine in subsection II.B. Next, sub-
section II.C describes the outcomes we analyze, and subsection II.D provides
details on our estimation of treatment effects.
A. Sample
As our sampling frame, we resort to the participants’ pool of our previous study
(Bettinger et al., 2020), undertaken over the 2016 school year. We already had
contact information for those parents, who had consented that we could reach out
for additional surveys. Out of the nearly 20,000 subjects in Bettinger et al. (2020),
we excluded those in pure control schools (because we anticipated that recall rates
could be significantly lower within that sub-sample) and those in schools assigned
to the nudge experiment (a sub-sample that was not balanced with respect to
group. Nevertheless, it could be that the latter inefficiently allocate their experimental budget to start
with (e.g. due to time-inconsistent preferences or cognitive constraints), such that financial worries
actually bring parents closer to optimality in the treatment group.
7That is the case because the net present value of the investment is extremely high, given the high
labor market returns to educational achievement in Brazil (see Appendix B).
8See Appendix B.
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student characteristics relative to the main study pool), what left us with 12,597
parents to re-contact in 2017.
Out of those, we successfully re-contacted 2,223 subjects. Appendix C compiles
balance and selective non-response tests. Section II.B provides further details
about the prior RCT assignment, and describes how we cross-randomized those
study participants to our survey and information experiments.
B. Experiment design
We study the psychological effects of poverty on parents’ willingness to invest
in the educational program by combining a phone survey with three different
experiments – as described in the subsections below. Table D1 in Appendix D
showcases the sample distribution across all treatment cells.
Phone survey
To causally identify the psychological effects of poverty on parents’ investment
decision, we resort to a survey experiment. In that survey, conducted exactly
one year after enrollment for the original experiment took place, we endow all
2,223 parents we are able to re-contact with R$ 10 (about USD 3, at the time)
in exchange for answering a phone survey (interactive voice response unit, IVR).
Over the course of that survey, subjects are offered the opportunity to invest this
endowment in signing up for the same SMS program evaluated in Bettinger et al.
(2020).9 If a parent signed up for the program, text messages were effectively
delivered throughout the third and fourth school quarters of 2017.10
Previous RCT assignment
We explore exogenous variation in the extent to which participants had prior
experience with the educational program over the previous school year by taking
advantage of random assignment in Bettinger et al. (2020). In that study, under-
taken over the two last school quarters of 2016, some parents of 9th-grade public
school students were randomly assigned to weekly text messages from the school,
while others received no weekly messages (the control group). Within those tar-
geted by text messages, some were assigned to weekly information about their
children’s attendance, tardiness and homework completion, while others were as-
signed to salience messages that highlighted important dimensions of children’s
school life (but without child specific information). Since Bettinger et al. (2020)
shows that child-specific information and salience messages had statistically iden-
tical impacts on educational outcomes relative to the pure control group, we pool
9See Appendix A for the full script of how the investment decision was framed.
10All parents who signed up in 2017 were targeted by messages meant to make their children’s school
life more salient, without child-specific information.
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both groups in the context of this paper.11 Manipulation checks at the end of
the previous experiment confirm that parents assigned to the treatment group
are much more likely to recall receiving text messages from the school (89.8%,
versus 46.4% in the control group, a statistically significant difference at the 1%
level). Taking advantage of experimental variation in prior experience with the
program, we then analyze how it affects parents’ willingness of investing in it.
Priming financial worries
At the beginning of the phone survey, we asked parents what they would do if
their child’s school started charging a high amount for textbooks and uniforms
(R$ 400, or about USD 130), and that amount were due at the end of that month.
Brazilian public schools do not charge for textbooks or uniforms; the message was
meant to trigger financial worries in face of unanticipated expenses. This priming
technique, meant to make financial worries top-of-mind, attempts to emulate
the psychological feeling of having financial worries constantly salient among the
poor. Following previous studies (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013), the control
group is asked a variation of the same question, in which the only difference
is that schools are said to charge a low amount instead (R$ 20, or about USD
6.50).12 The advantage of doing that is that all parents are primed to think about
unanticipated expenses linked to their children’ education; the only difference is
that the magnitude of those expenses differ by a factor of 20. Assignment within
the survey experiment was stratified by treatment assignment in the previous
RCT. Taking advantage of experimental variation in financial worries, we then
analyze how they affect parents’ willingness to investing in the SMS program.
Informing parents about the effects of the program
We cross-randomized parents to an intervention that disclosed the predicted
effect of the SMS program on their child’s absenteeism in math classes. Half
of participants were informed over SMS about their child-specific predicted just
two days prior the phone survey; the other half (the control group) received
a neutral message, stating the number of families who had received messages
from the program over the previous year. We used a much simpler algorithm to
predict heterogeneous treatment effects on math attendance (causal trees instead
of random forests; see Appendix B). We wanted to generate the simplest possible
predictions that parents would still be able to successfully interpret. We rounded
predicted treatment effects to the nearest integer, and informed parents that
the program either did not decrease absences when predicted effects were non-
positive, or that it was expected to decrease 1, 2 or 3 absences over a period of 6
11The control group could still receive messages from the school, but at much lower frequency: schools
could send up to 1 school-wide SMS per month, with communication about school activities. Less than
25% of schools ultimately did so.
12See Appendix A for the full script of treatment and control messages.
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months (see Appendix A for the exact framing of the treatment and control text
messages).
Effect sizes are small even for students for whom the program’s impacts on
graduation rates are very large; as Bettinger et al. (2020) shows, the SMS inter-
vention works through an array of additional mechanisms, including children’s
time use outside of school hours. Appendix D shows that child-specific predicted
effects on attendance are not even informative about its effects on graduation
rates (those are nearly zero correlated; Table D2).
Assignment within the information experiment was stratified by predicted treat-
ment effects on math attendance and by treatment assignment in the previous
RCT. Taking advantage of experimental variation in information about invest-
ment returns, we then analyze how it affects parents’ willingness to investing in
the SMS program.
C. Data and outcomes
Our key outcome of interest is parents’ decision to invest in the SMS program
or not. As part of the phone survey, we also elicit financial worries to document
whether the priming indeed makes parents more likely to worry about household
bills. Moreover, we also measure parents’ cognitive performance in tests meant to
capture their attention, working memory and impulse control, to provide evidence
on the psychological mechanism underlying the effects of financial worries on
investment decisions. Those additional outcomes are collected only after the
investment decision has been elicited (see Appendix A for the complete script of
the phone survey). The survey takes about 6 minutes in total.
We also have socio-demographic data on student and their primary caregivers’
characteristics, from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s baseline survey. We use college
education as a proxy of high socioeconomic status (SES). Appendix D shows that
college education is 4-fold more likely within higher income brackets, with the
advantage that while nearly 30% of subjects chose not to report income, we have
information about caregivers’ education for all subjects. Table D4 in Appendix
D documents the correlation between willingness to invest and this proxy of high
SES within the control group of our experiments (i.e. among parents without
prior experience with the SMS program, not primed about financial worries, and
not informed about the program’s returns). High-SES parents are much more
likely to undertake the investment: 48.2% of those invest in the SMS program,
while only 31% of low-SES parents do so – a 35.7% SES investment gap (see
Figure G1 in Appendix G).
D. Estimation
We estimate the following equation, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
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In equation 1, Yi = 1 if parent i invests in the SMS program, and 0 otherwise;
Priori = 1 if parent i was randomly assigned to the SMS program in the previous
RCT, and 0 otherwise; Primingi = 1 if parent i is primed about financial worries,
and 0 otherwise; Xi is a vector of student and family characteristics; and εi is an
error term. We are interested in testing whether priming parents about financial
worries decreases willingness to invest (β1, β2 ≤ 0).13
At first, we restrict the analysis to the sub-sample of parents not informed about
the returns of the program. In Section V.B, we estimate the full-interaction model
to explicitly test whether the effects of the priming are statistically the same to
those of information.
We also estimate effects separately by socioeconomic status to test the hypoth-
esis that the psychological effects of financial worries are concentrated on low-SES
parents. To do that, we split the sample according to whether parents are college
educated or not. We estimate seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in order to
test whether priming effects are statistically different across low- and high-SES
parents.
Since treatment is assigned at the individual level within each experiment, we
do not cluster standard errors.
III. Effects of the priming on financial worries
This section starts by discussing balance and selective non-response tests in
subsection III.A. Next, subsection III.B presents manipulation tests to document
that priming indeed makes financial worries top-of-mind.
A. Balance and selective non-response tests
Even though treatment conditions were randomly assigned across all subjects in
the sampling frame, because take-up of the phone survey is low — only 11.2% of
the universe picks up and answers the call through the end — it could be the case
that the sample we end up with is selected with respect to one or more treatment
conditions, or unbalanced with respect to students’ or caregivers’ characteris-
tics. Appendix C documents that this is not the case: in our sample, treatment
assignment is balanced within the prior RCT, the survey experiment, and the
information experiment. Moreover, none of the interventions significantly predict
response rates. This is the case even though 58.4% of our subjects have prior
13We do not estimate an instrumental variables model because worries are measured only coarsely
in our phone survey – what would decrease the precision of our estimates without adding much to
interpretability. Nonetheless, we use our survey measure to validate that the priming actually increases
financial worries as intended.
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experience with the SMS program; the reason is that this figure approximately
matches the share of treated subjects within Bettinger et al. (2020)’s sub-samples
we target, once we combine the information and salience treatments. As such, we
can attribute causal effects to any differences across treatment conditions in the
context of our experiments.
B. Financial worries
We start by verifying whether the priming indeed increased financial worries
as intended. We elicit financial worries categorically; subjects rate how worried
they feel about not having enough money to pay all household bills at the end
of the month (‘not at all’, ‘somewhat worried’, ‘very worried’ or ‘desperate’; see
Appendix A for the full script). Appendix D shows that, while 57.3% of subjects
report to be very worried or desperate in the control group of our experiments (as
most of our sample is indeed poor), those made to worry about unexpected and
urgent school expenses are 8.3 percentage-point more likely to report being very
worried or desperate about household bills due by the end of the month (significant
at the 1% level). Consistent with the psychological mechanism, primed low-SES
parents are over 45% more likely to state that they are desperate than primed
high-SES ones (p-value of the difference=0.112).
IV. Effects of financial worries on investments in children
Subsection IV.A turns to the the psychological effects of poverty on the invest-
ment decision, followed by robustness checks in subsection IV.B.
A. Main results
Table 1 estimates the effect of the priming on the probability of investing in
the SMS program, following equation 1, restricting attention to the control group
of the information experiment. Column (1) shows that prior experience with the
program increases the likelihood of investment by 18 p.p. (from a 32.9% basis in
the control group of our experiments), which corresponds almost exactly to the
17.2 p.p. SES investment gap (see Section II.C). Having said that, priming finan-
cial worries decreases investments by 10.8 p.p. among those parents (significant
at the 10% level) – reopening roughly 2/3 of the SES investment gap. Columns
(2) and (3) show that the effect of the priming among those with prior experience
with the program is entirely driven by low-SES parents (significant at the 5%
level), consistent with the psychological mechanism (p-value of the difference =
0.145). This pattern rules out that the priming merely decreases trust in public
schools – what would decrease willingness to invest across all primed parents.
Moreover, priming financial worries has no significant effects on parents without
prior experience with the program (whose willingness to invest was already low),
ruling out that it merely leads the poor to ‘optimally’ save (even if the endowment
is quite small) for other planned educational expenses outside the experiment, in
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case they believe that textbooks and uniforms are no longer free. Treatment
effects are extremely robust to including socio-demographic characteristics and
controlling flexibly for predicted returns (column 4), and to allowing the effects




















































Table 1—Effects of prior experience and priming on willingness to invest
Information = 0
Overall Low-SES High-SES Overall Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior experience 0.180*** 0.195*** 0.052 0.190*** 0.191***
(0.0413) (0.0439) (0.1223) (0.0420) (0.0420)
Priming x Prior experience -0.108* -0.140** 0.121 -0.121** -0.119*
(0.0588) (0.0626) (0.1699) (0.0597) (0.0664)
Priming 0.042 0.061 -0.106 0.056 0.025
(0.0445) (0.0473) (0.1313) (0.0453) (0.0520)
Priming x Prior experience x Predicted returns -0.127
(1.1178)
Priming x Predicted returns 1.245
(1.0106)
p-value (Priming x Prior exp. [low-SES] = [high-SES]) 0.145
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Predicted returns (cubic polynomial) No No No Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.329 0.310 0.481 0.329 0.329
Observations 1139 993 146 1122 1122
R-Squared 0.019 0.022 0.018 0.024 0.026
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with dependent variable = 1 if the subject chose to exchange R$
10 in airtime credit for 6 months of the SMS program, and 0 otherwise. Regressions within sub-sample
not informed over text message about child-specific predicted effects of the SMS program on attendance
(Information = 0). Prior experience = 1 if the subject was randomly assigned to the SMS program in
the previous RCT, and 0 otherwise. Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial worries, and 0
otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s
experimental results, using machine learning techniques. Controls include student’s race, age and gender,




Appendix E shows that our results are extremely robust to controlling flexibly
for an alternative version of predicted returns, computed within a different sub-
sample of parents in Bettinger et al. (2020) who received weekly nudges via text
messages over the previous school year – without overlap with our participants’
pool.
Most importantly, Appendix E shows that the effect size of financial worries on
the likelihood of investment among those with prior experience with the program
not only remains very large as we restrict attention to parents above the 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles of predicted returns, but also, remains largely stable and
precisely estimated – despite the progressively smaller sample sizes. This supports
the claim that financial worries lead poor parents to sub-optimally under-invest
in face of large returns: for parents at the 75th percentile, risk aversion would
have to be implausibly large to justify such a small certainty equivalent, as the
expected value of the investment for those parents is roughly 350-fold that of the
outside option (see Appendix B).
V. Attention misallocation
This section turns to the mechanism behind the effects of financial worries on
investment decisions. We start by testing whether financial worries reallocate
attention to short-term rewards in subsection V.A, with the help of incentivized
cognitive tests. Next, subsection V.B benchmarks the effects of the priming to
those of framing program’s returns as if they were small.
A. Cognitive function: Responses to small but immediate returns
Following Lichand and Mani (2020), we capture subjects’ executive functions in
our phone surveys with the help of audio cognitive tests. We use (1) digit span to
measure attention and working memory, whereby subjects must recall digits from
the sequences we play (the more digits accurately recalled, the higher the score);
and (2) Stroop to measure attention and impulse control, whereby subjects must
press the number of times they heard a particular digit repeated in a sequence (but
not the digit itself). See Appendix A for the full script. Importantly, performance
in those tests is incentivized: subjects are told they can earn extra R$ 2 (about
0.70 USD at the time) if they are amongst the 20% top-performers in those tests.
We test the hypothesis that financial worries lead poor subjects to respond to
such small but immediate returns to a greater extent. Figure 1 summarizes the
conclusions by focusing on the summary measure of cognitive performance (see
Appendix F for all details), separately for low-SES parents (Panel A) and high-
SES ones (Panel B). Among low-SES subjects (Panel A), priming financial worries
shifts the distribution of the summary measure of cognitive outcomes to the right
(p=0.02). The effect size is large, equivalent to 1/3 that of college education.
VOL ISSUE PSYCH. EFFECTS OF POVERTY ON INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 15
Consistent with the psychological mechanism, priming does not significantly shift
cognitive performance among high-SES parents (p=0.74; Panel B).
Figure 1. Effects of financial worries on cognitive performance, by SES
Panel A: Low-SES parents
Panel B: High-SES parents
Notes: Kernel density plots of the cognitive performance summary measure
residualised with respect to controls, separately for low-SES parents (Panel A)
and high-SES ones (Panel B). Controls include student’s race, age and gender,
and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling. P-values of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests of equality of distribution for subjects primed and not primed
within each panel.
16 MONTH YEAR
B. Benchmarking: Responses to framing future returns as small
Figure G4 in Appendix G showcases that the informational intervention de-
creased willingness to invest in the SMS program, relative to the control group.
Table 2 formally estimates the effect of informing parents about the effects of
the program on the probability of investing in it, symmetrically to equation 1,
restricting attention to the control group of the survey experiment at first. Col-
umn (1) shows that information decreases the likelihood of investment by 13.1
p.p. among parents with prior experience with the program (significant at the 5%
level), a slightly larger effect size than that of the priming in Table 1. Columns
(2) and (3) show that, just as in the case of the priming, the effect of framing
the returns of the program as small is entirely driven by low-SES parents (signif-
icant at the 5% level; p-value of the difference = 0.34). Once again, treatment
effects are extremely robust to including socio-demographic characteristics and
controlling flexibly for predicted returns (column 4), and to allowing the effects
of information to vary with predicted returns (column 5). Last, column (6) esti-
mates the full-interaction model; we do not reject the hypothesis that the effect




















































Table 2—Effects of prior experience and priming on willingness to invest
Priming = 0 Full sample
Overall Low-SES High-SES Overall Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prior experience 0.180*** 0.195*** 0.052 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.188***
(0.0412) (0.0437) (0.1232) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0413)
Information x Prior experience -0.131** -0.151** 0.034 -0.146** -0.130* -0.143**
(0.0596) (0.0629) (0.1878) (0.0603) (0.0676) (0.0598)
Information 0.033 0.048 -0.081 0.045 0.032 0.042
(0.0463) (0.0487) (0.1493) (0.0469) (0.0543) (0.0464)
Information x Prior experience x Predicted returns -0.643
(1.1831)
Information x Predicted returns 0.529
(1.0947)




Priming x Prior experience x Information 0.175**
(0.0843)
Priming x Information -0.090
(0.0645)
p-value(Info x Prior exp. [low-SES = high-SES]) 0.342
p-value([Info x Prior exp.] = [Priming x Prior exp.]) 0.681
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Predicted returns (cubic polynomial) No No No Yes Yes No
Control group mean 0.329 0.310 0.481 0.329 0.329 0.329
Observations 1125 998 127 1115 1115 2223
R-Squared 0.020 0.022 0.008 0.032 0.032 0.020
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with dependent variable = 1 if the subject chose to exchange R$ 10 in airtime credit for 6
months of the SMS program, and 0 otherwise. Prior experience = 1 if the subject was randomly assigned to the SMS program in
the previous RCT, and 0 otherwise. Information = 1 if the subject was informed over text message about child-specific predicted
effects of the SMS program on attendance, and 0 otherwise. Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial worries, and 0
otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using
machine learning techniques. Controls include student’s race, age and gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
18 MONTH YEAR
VI. Concluding remarks
In a lab-in-the-field experiment in which parents had the opportunity to invest
in a real educational program for their children in the absence of liquidity con-
straints, we documented that financial worries led poor parents to focus on small
but immediate rewards at the expense of large future investment returns. The fact
that primed low-SES parents under-invest relative to high-SES ones even when
returns are very high is evidence that poverty-induced attention misallocation
leads to inefficiency.
The fact that financial worries induce the poor to under-invest even when they
have the means to finance those investments and even when they can commit
(to overcome present-bias) is relevant as governments and civil society organiza-
tions now try to facilitate human capital investments through several financial
instruments, in the hopes of allowing the poor to break away from poverty traps.
Among credit lines to finance human capital investments, the PLUS programme
in the United States represented 15% of federal borrowing in 2015 (Kargar and
Mann, 2018).14 Among voucher programs to fund private school fees, several
cover only part of the total costs (in the US, see the Milwaukee Parental Choice
program, in Rouse, 1998; in developing countries, see PACES in Columbia, in An-
grist, Bettinger and Kremer, 2006, and the Chilean voucher system in McEwan
and Carnoy, 2000, and McEwan, 2001). Our findings suggest that such programs
might be insufficient if poverty leads parents to respond inefficiently to future
investment returns because it captures their attention to present needs.
An especially dramatic implication of our findings is that poverty’s psychologi-
cal effects are more likely to kick in precisely when the poor are presumably better
equipped to make informed investment decisions – as priming effects are concen-
trated on low-SES parents with prior experience with the SMS program. In effect,
poor parents often fail to take advantage of educational and health investments
even when informed about their returns.15
As such, adapting the environment to the psychology of the poor, either by
making long-term returns top-of-mind, or by making decisions automatic (such
as by granting universal access to educational programs funded by governments
or third-party organizations), may be key to mitigate the effects of attention
misallocation – in particular when it comes to investments in children, linked to
inter-generational poverty traps.
14In developing countries, see for instance the school fee loan program by Opportunity International
(https://opportunity.org/what-we-do/education-finance/lending-for-education).
15While Jensen (2010) and Dizon-Ross (2019) document sizeable responses to information on returns
to investments in children, Kremer and Holla (2009) and Kremer and Glennerster (2011) discuss several
examples in education and health for which even informed parents under-invest.
VOL ISSUE PSYCH. EFFECTS OF POVERTY ON INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 19
REFERENCES
Agostinelli, Francesco, Morteza Saharkhiz, and Matthew J Wiswall.
2020. “Home and School in the Development of Children. NBER Working Paper
No. 26037.” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Allcott, Hunt, Benjamin B Lockwood, and Dmitry Taubinsky. 2019.
“Should we tax sugar-sweetened beverages? An overview of theory and evi-
dence.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(3): 202–27.
Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, and Michael Kremer. 2006. “Long-term
educational consequences of secondary school vouchers: Evidence from admin-
istrative records in Colombia.” American economic review, 96(3): 847–862.
Athey, Susan, and Guido W Imbens. 2017. “The state of applied econo-
metrics: Causality and policy evaluation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
31(2): 3–32.
Bai, Liang, Benjamin Handel, Edward Miguel, and Gautam Rao. 2017.
“Self-control and demand for preventive health: Evidence from hypertension
in India.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1–55.
Barnard, Wendy Miedel. 2004. “Parent involvement in elementary school and
educational attainment.” Children and youth services review, 26(1): 39–62.
Becker, Gary S, and Nigel Tomes. 1979. “An equilibrium theory of the distri-
bution of income and intergenerational mobility.” Journal of political Economy,
87(6): 1153–1189.
Benjamin, Daniel J, James J Choi, and A Joshua Strickland. 2010.
“Social identity and preferences.” American Economic Review, 100(4): 1913–
28.
Bessone, Pedro, Gautam Rao, Frank Schilbach, Heather Schofield, and
Mattie Toma. 2020. “The economic consequences of increasing sleep among
the urban poor.” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bettinger, E, N Cunha, G Lichand, and R Madeira. 2020. “Are the Ef-
fects of Informational Interventions Driven by Salience?” University of Zurich,
Department of Economics Working Paper 350.
Burlacu, Sergiu, Anandi Mani, Piero Ronzani, and Lucia Savadori.
2019. “Psychology of poverty, financial incentives and parental investment in
early childhood.”
Callen, Michael, Mohammad Isaqzadeh, James D Long, and Charles
Sprenger. 2014. “Violence and risk preference: Experimental evidence from
Afghanistan.” American Economic Review, 104(1): 123–48.
20 MONTH YEAR
Chernozhukov, Victor, Mert Demirer, Esther Duflo, and Ivan
Fernandez-Val. 2018. “Generic machine learning inference on heterogenous
treatment effects in randomized experiments.” National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Cohen, Jessica, Pascaline Dupas, and Simone Schaner. 2015. “Price sub-
sidies, diagnostic tests, and targeting of malaria treatment: evidence from a
randomized controlled trial.” American Economic Review, 105(2): 609–45.
Cohn, Alain, Ernst Fehr, and Lorenz Goette. 2013. “Fair wages and effort
provision: combining evidence from the lab and the field.” University of Zurich
Department of Economics Working Paper, , (107).
Cohn, Alain, Jan Engelmann, Ernst Fehr, and Michel André Maréchal.
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Online Appendix A - Phone Survey Script
A1. Outcomes
FINANCIAL WORRIES
“How worried are you about not having money to pay all household bills at the
end of this month? If you are not worried at all, press 0; if you are somewhat
worried, press 1; if you are very worried, press 2; or if you are desperate, press
3.”
INVESTMENT DECISION
“You already earned R$10 in airtime credit by answering this call until the end.
Would you rather exchange those R$10 for 6 months of weekly text messages
about your child’s school life? If you would like to exchange airtime by the text
messages, press 1; if you would like to keep the airtime, press 2; or to listen again,
press 9.”
COGNITIVE TESTS
Stroop: “Answer as fast as you can: how many times is each digit repeated in
the following strings? Answer the number of repetitions, not the number itself.”
(A) 9 9 9 9; (B) 6 6 6 6 6; (C) 0 0 0 ; (D) 4 4 4 4 4.
Digit span: “Please type the sequence of digits exactly as you hear them.”
(A) 4 8 2 0 5; (B) 5 2 9 1 7; (C) 9 7 3 8 1 5; (D) 0 6 2 7 6 4.
A2. Treatment and control conditions across the experiments
PREVIOUS RCT
Control group: At most 1 school-wide SMS every other week, with communi-
cation about school activities.
Treatment group: 1 SMS per week from the school with child-specific informa-
tion or salience messages (see Bettinger et al., 2020).
SURVEY EXPERIMENT
Control group: “Please tell us after the tone what you would do if your child’s
school started charging R$ 20 for school uniforms, payable by the end of this
month?”
Treatment group: “Please tell us after the tone what you would do if your




Control group: “Last year, over 19,000 families in the State of São Paulo re-
ceived weekly text messages about their children’s school life.”
Treatment group: “Last year, we found out that sending messages about your
child’s school life has the potential to decrease his/her absences by 0/1/2/3 over
the course of six months.”
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Online Appendix B - Additional Details on Predicted Returns
B1. Causal random forests: predicted effects on graduation rates
Following Wager and Athey (2018), we implement causal random forests to
estimate child-specific predicted impacts of the SMS program, evaluated in the
previous RCT, on the probability of grade promotion. Causal forests estimate
heterogeneity in treatment effects by splitting the data in partitions for which
treatment effects are the largest. We estimate honest trees – holding out non-
overlapping test samples – to prevent biased estimates from over-fitting.
Concretely, we apply the causal random forest algorithm to a subset of the
parents in Bettinger et al. (2020): those assigned to child-specific information or
salience messages, and those in the pure control group. We exclude those assigned
to the within-classroom control group because of spillovers, and those assigned
to the nudge experiment because of baseline imbalances (we turn to those in
Appendix B.B3). The final sub-sample consists of 10,264 students.
The primary dependent variable of our analysis is whether the child has been
promoted to the next grade. The set of covariates used to estimate the hetero-
geneous treatment effects, βi, includes student race, age, gender, first quarter’s
math and Portuguese attendance and GPA, and their caregiver’s race, age, family
tie, income and schooling.
A fundamental identifying assumption of this algorithm is unconfoundedness,
i.e. {Y (1), Y (0)} ⊥ T |X, where T denotes the treatment indicator variable, X
denotes the covariate’s vector and Y is the outcome vector. In other words, it
implies that the treatment indicator is independent of potential outcomes, after
controlling for the covariate vector. This assumption is satisfied by random assign-
ment; Bettinger et al. (2020) documents that the different groups were balanced
according to students’ and their caregivers’ baseline characteristics.
We trained the forest on 80% of the sample and used default tuning parameters,
clustering standard errors at the classroom level. For each tree’s split, the forest
evaluates the extent of heterogeneity in treatment effect by each covariate, and
splits each tree on the variable that maximizes such heterogeneity. Table B1
documents each covariate’s importance, defined as how often each variable was
used in a tree split, across all tress. Student baseline Portuguese and math GPA
are the two most often used features in predicting heterogeneous treatment effects
in our estimates, with 35.6% and 24.8% of the splits based on those, respectively.
We assess the quality of our forest’s estimates using a test motivated by Cher-
nozhukov et al. (2018). The idea is to fit conditional average treatment effects
(CATE), τ(x) = E[Y (1) − Y (0)|X = x], as a linear function of the predictions
and apply a heteroskedasticity-consistent test of calibration. Two predictions are
produced, Mean forest prediction and Differential forest prediction. The coeffi-
cient of the latter can be used to test hypothesis of heterogeneity of treatment
effects. Results, presented in table B2, suggest that this is the case (p=0.05).
















Notes: Importance of the variables in training
the forest indicates how often a variable was
used in a tree split. The variables are ordered
by importance, with larger values indicating
greater importance. Parameters of the forest
training: num.trees = 2000, honesty = True,
clusters = classroom, seed = 123 and others
at default setting.
on the probability of grade promotion for our study participants, based on the
causal forest’s estimates summarized in this Appendix.
B2. Details on computation of returns on investment
To give a rough sense of child-specific returns on investment, we can con-
vert child-specific predicted effects of the SMS program on graduation rates
into its predicted impacts on the present value of life-long earnings, using the
correlation between one additional year of schooling and monthly earnings in
the 2017 Brazil National Household Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de
Domićılios, PNAD) from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (In-
stituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat́ıstica, IBGE). Concretely, we sum over this
average monthly earnings differential (R$ 135.76) from ages 18 to 65 (the active
work ages), discounting flows by the yearly interest rate (fixed at 9.74%, the av-
erage yearly basic interest rate in Brazil over 2017), and then scale this value by
child-specific predict impacts of the program on graduation rates. Subtracting
this expected present value by the value of the outside option (that of keeping
the R$ 10 endowment as airtime credit) yields the expected net present value of
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Figure B1. Predicted treatment effects of the program on child’s grade promotion
Notes: Density of child-specific predicted treatment effects of the SMS program
on grade promotion, using causal random forests. βi is the predicted treatment
effect for family i, estimated as a function of child’s and caretaker’s race, age
and gender, of family’s socioeconomic status, of caretaker’s education and child’s
grades and attendance. Parameters of the forest training: num.trees = 2000,
honesty = True, clusters = classroom, seed = 123 and others at default setting.
28 MONTH YEAR
Table B2—Assessing forest’s goodness of fit
Estimate Std. Error t-stat p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean forest prediction 1.01 0.51 1.98 0.02
Differential forest prediction 0.74 0.46 1.62 0.05
Notes: Best linear fit using forest predictions (on held-out data) as well as the
mean forest prediction as regressors, along with one-sided heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. A coefficient of 1 for Mean forest prediction suggests
that the average prediction produced by the forest is correct; and a coefficient
of 1 for Differential forest prediction suggests that the forest has captured
heterogeneity in the underlying signal. The p-value of the latter coefficient
also serves as an Omnibus test: if the coefficient is greater than 0, then we can
reject the null of no heterogeneity. Parameters of the forest training: num.trees
= 2000, honesty = True, clusters = classroom, seed = 123 and others at default
setting.
the investment.
This procedure provides only a rough approximation for a variety of reasons.
It assumes, for instance, that parents discount the future by the same extent as
the basic interest rate, that parents care about their children’s future earnings as
much as they care about their current consumption (perfect altruism), that the
correlation between one additional year of educational attainment and earnings
is similar to the causal effect of an additional school year on earnings, and that
the program increases the likelihood of an additional school year but not more.
Subtracting the present cost from the present value of investment returns further
assumes that parents are risk neutral.
Having said that, the yearly earnings differential from an additional school year
is so large that, despite high interest rates, the net present value of an additional
school year is R$ 12,504.08. While this yields a negative return on investment
(ROI) for the study participant with the minimal predicted effect of the program
on graduation rates (-0.8%), the ROI at the 25th percentile (a 0.4% increase in
graduation rates) is already R$ 44 (over 4-fold the investment cost); at the median
(a 1.1% increase in graduation rates), R$ 125 (over 12-fold the investment cost);
at the 75th percentile (a 2.8% increase in graduation rates), R$ 335 (over 33-fold
the investment cost); and for the study participant with the maximal predicted
effect of the program (23.9%), R$ 2,981 (almost 300-fold its cost).
B3. Alternative predicted effects on graduation rates
To assess the robustness of our predictions, we also resort to an alternative
version of predicted returns on graduation rates by training the causal forest on a
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different subset of parents – those assigned to the nudge experiment in Bettinger
et al. (2020). This sub-sample has no overlap with our study participants.
As in Bettinger et al. (2020), we estimate treatment effects using differences-in-
differences, contrasting treated students with the pure control group, before and
after the onset of the nudges in the third school quarter, to deal with baseline
imbalances between this sub-sample of treated parents and the pure control group.
Estimating treatment effects on grade promotion with this strategy is challenging,
because pass/fail status is only defined at the last school quarter.
To deal with this challenge, we compute a quarterly proxy of grade promotion
by applying the end-of-year pass/fail criteria within each quarter: a student is
eligble to advance to the next grade if s/he has a GPA above 5 (the minimum
passing grade; GPA ranges from 0 to 10) and attendance above 75% in each
subject. Since we only have data on math and Portuguese attendance and GPA,
our proxy is based on those two subjects.
In sum, we predict child-specific treatment effects on graduation rates by com-
bining the differences-in-differences strategy for the effects of the SMS program
on our proxy of grade promotion with the causal random forest algorithm.
We first average over child-specific predicted differences between treatment and
control on the first two school quarters – before the onset of the text messages –, to
estimate the pre-treatment differences (if any). We then subtract the last quarter
predicted returns of the program from such baseline differences, resulting in child-
specific differences-in-differences estimates of the SMS program on graduation
rates. Figure B2 displays the density of the predicted effects of the SMS program
on the probability of grade promotion for our study participants, based on the
causal forest’s estimates summarized in this Appendix.
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Figure B2. Predicted treatment effects of the program on child’s grade promotion
Notes: Density of child-specific predicted treatment effects on grade promotion
(proxied by the pass/fail criteria within each quarter), restricting attention to
the nudge experiment in Bettinger et al. (2020), combining a
differences-in-differences strategy with causal random forests. βi is the predicted
treatment effect for family i, estimated as a function of child’s and caretaker’s
race, age and gender, of family’s socioeconomic status, of caretaker’s education
and child’s grades and attendance. Parameters of the forest training: num.trees
= 2000, honesty = True, clusters = classroom, seed = 123 and others at default
setting.
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B4. Causal trees: predicted effects on attendance
Following Athey and Imbens (2017), we implement regression trees to partition
the sample into subgroups according to heterogeneity in treatment effects of the
SMS program on student attendance. The regression tree estimation algorithm
trades off goodness-of-fit against over-fitting to fine-tune the depth of the tree,
that is, the complexity of how it partitions the data to predict individual-level
treatment effects. While the procedure is known to over-fit in the case of extreme
leaves, we were interested in the simplest possible prediction that is still statis-
tically grounded. For our purposes, predicted heterogeneous treatment effects
of the SMS program on student attendance provides an objective measure that
could be tied to returns on investment and easily communicated to our study
participants.
We use the algorithm to predict child-specific effects of the SMS program on
math attendance, allowing the algorithm to estimate different treatment effects
by all students’ and primary caregivers’ characteristics from the baseline survey
in Bettinger et al. (2020).
Figure B3 displays the density of the predicted effects of the SMS program
on 4th-quarter math attendance for our study participants, based on the causal
trees’ estimates summarized in this Appendix. As shown, the algorithm picks
caregivers’ age as the main dimension on which to partition the dataset, further
allowing impacts to vary by student’s gender in the case of caregivers between 33
and 40 years old (girls benefit more than boys, with 1 extra absence reduced by
the program over the course of 6 months).
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Figure B3. Predicted treatment effects of the program on child’s absences within
6 months
Notes: Predicted treatment effects of the SMS program on child’s absences
(rounded to the nearest integer), using a regression tree based on the estimates
of Bettinger et al. (2020). βi is the predicted treatment effect for family i,
estimated as a function of child’s and caretaker’s race, age and gender, of
family’s socioeconomic status and of caretaker’s education. Parameters of the
tree estimation: split.Rule = ”TOT”, cv.option = ”fit”, minsize = 250,
cv.Honest = F, split.Bucket = T, xval = 10, propensity = 0.8.
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Online Appendix C - Selective Non-Response and Balance Tests
This Appendix presents selective non-response and balance tests. Table C1
shows that while the take up of the phone survey is low on average, it is not
systematically different across the different experimental arms. Reassuringly, it
also showcases that treatment status within each of the three experiments was
cross-randomized, as the coefficients of each treatment do not change when we
control for all of them together (Column 4).
Tables C2, C3 and C4 compile balance tests for the survey experiment, the prior
RCT, and the information experiment, respectively. The tables display sample
means of students’ and caregivers’ characteristics separately for the treatment and
control groups within each experiment, along with statistical tests of equality of
means across groups for each variable, and of joint statistical significance across
all of them. We document that all experiments are balanced, with no systematic
joint differences (given by F-tests) at conventional significance levels. For the few
variables characterized by statistically significant imbalances within each experi-
ment – consistent with the rate expected to happen just by chance –, differences
are very small in magnitude, with no economic significance.
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Table C1—Selective non-response tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priming 0.001 0.001
(0.0056) (0.0056)




Control group mean 0.112 0.109 0.116 0.112
Observations 12597 12597 12597 12597
R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with dependant variable =
1 if the subject answered the phone survey in full, and 0 otherwise.
Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial worries, and 0
otherwise. Prior experience = 1 if the subject was assigned to the
treatment group in Bettinger et al. (2020), and 0 otherwise. Infor-
mation = 1 if the subject was informed over text message about
child-specific predicted returns of the SMS program on attendance,
and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table C2—Balance Tests: Not primed vs. Primed
Not primed Primed Difference
(1) (2) (2) - (1)
Black or brown student 0.404 0.421 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Black or brown caregiver 0.413 0.429 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Student’s age 14.711 14.673 -0.039
(0.020) (0.020) (0.029)
Caregiver’s age 39.258 39.465 0.208
(0.199) (0.224) (0.299)
Female student 0.817 0.788 -0.029*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
Mother is the primary caregiver 0.504 0.510 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Incomplete primary education 0.271 0.265 -0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019)
Less than 1 minimum wage 0.172 0.168 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
p-value(F test of joint significance) 0.64
Notes: Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial worries, and
0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table C3—Balance Tests: No prior experience vs. Prior experience
No prior experience Prior experience Difference
(1) (2) (2) - (1)
Black or brown student 0.419 0.408 -0.012
(0.016) (0.014) (0.021)
Black or brown caregiver 0.412 0.428 0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.021)
Student’s age 14.687 14.695 0.008
(0.023) (0.018) (0.029)
Caregiver’s age 39.244 39.443 0.199
(0.225) (0.200) (0.304)
Female student 0.821 0.790 -0.031*
(0.013) (0.011) (0.017)
Mother is the primary caregiver 0.504 0.509 0.005
(0.016) (0.014) (0.022)
Incomplete primary education 0.269 0.267 -0.002
(0.015) (0.012) (0.019)
Less than 1 minimum wage 0.166 0.173 0.006
(0.012) (0.010) (0.016)
p-value(F test of joint significance) 0.61
Notes: Prior experience = 1 if subject was assigned to the treatment group in Bettinger
et al. (2020), and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table C4—Balance Tests: Not informed vs. Informed
Not informed Informed Difference
(1) (2) (2) - (1)
Black or brown student 0.416 0.409 -0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Black or brown caregiver 0.421 0.421 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Student’s age 14.700 14.683 -0.017
(0.020) (0.021) (0.029)
Caregiver’s age 39.371 39.349 -0.023
(0.206) (0.218) (0.300)
Female student 0.810 0.794 -0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
Mother is the primary caregiver 0.496 0.518 0.022
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Incomplete primary education 0.277 0.259 -0.017
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019)
Less than 1 minimum wage 0.189 0.150 -0.038**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
p-value(F test of joint significance) 0.43
Notes: Information = 1 if subject was informed over text message about child-specific
predicted returns of the SMS program on attendance, and 0 otherwise. Standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Online Appendix D - Descriptive Statistics and Manipulation Tests
This Appendix compiles descriptive statistics, and manipulation tests for the
survey experiment. Table D1 showcases the sample distribution across all experi-
ments. Table D2 documents that the correlation between child-specific predicted
effects of the SMS program on students’ graduation rates and attendance is close
to zero, as discussed in the main text. Next, Table D3 helps validate our usage
of college education as a proxy for high socioeconomic status (SES): college ed-
ucation is four times more prevalent amongst high-income caregivers (those with
monthly earnings of 3 minimum wages or higher) than among low-income ones.
Next, Table D4 documents differences in willingness to invest in the SMS pro-
gram between low- and high-SES parents. High-SES parents are much more likely
to undertake the investment: 48.2% of those invest in the SMS program, while
only 31% of low-SES parents do so – a 35% SES investment gap.
Last, Tables D5 and D6 show that priming significantly increases financial wor-
ries on average, and especially so for low-SES parents.
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Table D1—Sample Distribution
Prior experience = 0 Prior experience = 1
Priming = 0 Priming = 1 Priming = 0 Priming = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information = 0 240 245 340 314
Information = 1 207 233 338 306
Notes: The total sample size is 2,223 subjects. Priming = 1 if subject was primed
about financial worries, and 0 otherwise. Prior experience = 1 if the subject was
assigned to the treatment group in Bettinger et al. (2020), and 0 otherwise. In-
formation = 1 if the subject was informed over text message about child-specific












Table D2—Correlation between returns and info
ρ
Predicted returns on student’s pass/fail status and attendance -0.031
Positive predicted returns on student’s pass/fail status and attendance 0.051
Notes: Child-specific predicted returns on child’s pass/fail status and school attendance
generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental returns, using machine learning tech-
niques.
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Table D3—Proxy for SES
Panel A: Sample income distribution
Income Frequency Percent
< 1 MW 2118 16.82
[1 MW, 3 MW) 5809 46.13
[3 MW, 6 MW) 926 7.35
[6 MW, 11 MW) 101 0.80
> 11 MW 17 0.13
Not reported 3623 28.77
Total 12594 100.00
Panel B: Income vs. College education





Notes: Income brackets defined by caregivers’ monthly in-
come from all sources, reported in minimum wages (MW).













Table D4—Low vs. High SES
Full sample Prior Priming = 0 Information = 0 Information,
experience = 0 Priming and
Prior experience = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High-SES 0.087*** 0.068 0.083* 0.080* 0.172*
(0.0322) (0.0498) (0.0464) (0.0438) (0.0958)
Control group mean 0.396 0.339 0.405 0.413 0.310
Observations 2223 925 1125 1139 240
R-Squared 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.013
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with dependent variable = 1 if the subject chose to exchange R$ 10 in
airtime credit for 6 months of the SMS program, and 0 otherwise. High-SES = 1 if the subject completed higher
education, and 0 otherwise. Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial worries, and 0 otherwise. Prior
experience = 1 if the subject was assigned to the treatment group in Bettinger et al. (2020), and 0 otherwise.
Information = 1 if the subject was informed over text message about child-specific predicted returns of the
SMS program on attendance, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table D5—Effects on financial worries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priming 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.084***
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0262)
Priming x Predicted returns -0.172
(0.5776)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Predicted returns (cubic polynomial) No No Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.564
Observations 2103 2103 2071 2071
R-Squared 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.017
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with dependent variable = 1 if the subject
reported being very worried or desperate about paying household bills by the end of
the month, and 0 otherwise. Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial wor-
ries, and 0 otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates generated
from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using machine learning techniques.
Controls include student’s race, age and gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income












Table D6—Effects on financial worries by SES
Very worried or desperate Desperate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High-SES 0.026 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.025
(0.0471) (0.0478) (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0376)
Priming 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.014
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0276) (0.0217)
High-SES x Priming -0.009 -0.014 -0.022 -0.023 -0.083
(0.0656) (0.0656) (0.0660) (0.0661) (0.0519)
Priming x Predicted returns -0.184 0.332
(0.5790) (0.4540)
p-value(High-SES x Priming = 0) 0.894 0.830 0.743 0.729 0.112
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted returns (cubic polynomial) No No Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.561 0.171
Observations 2103 2103 2071 2071 2071
R-Squared 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.014
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with very worried or desperate as the dependent variable
in first four columns and desperate as the dependent variable in the last column. Very worried or
desperate = 1 if the subject reported being very worried or desperate about paying household bills
by the end of the month, and 0 otherwise. Desperate = 1 if the subject reported being desperate
about paying household bills by the end of the month, and 0 otherwise. High-SES = 1 if the
subject completed higher education, and 0 otherwise. Priming = 1 if subject was primed about
financial worries, and 0 otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates generated
from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using machine learning techniques. Controls
include student’s race, age and gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Online Appendix E - Predicted Returns and Robustness Tests
An active literature in behavioral public economics deals with the challenge of
evaluating whether decisions are optimal by constructing a “counterfactual nor-
mative decision-maker” based on survey data – taking as “optimal” the decisions
made by fully informed subjects (possibly augmented by other features such as
lack of self-control problems; see for instance Allcott, Lockwood and Taubinsky,
2019). Decisions that deviate from that “normative” pattern are interpreted as
biased. This approach assumes that any unobserved preferences are conditionally
independent of bias. In our setting, that would be equivalent to assuming that
being informed about investment returns does not correlate with subject-specific
returns – a strong assumption in face of complementarities between school and
home environment (see Agostinelli, Saharkhiz and Wiswall, 2020).
In contrast, our approach does not rely on such strong assumption. We observe
predicted returns of the program for all study participants, thanks to the com-
bination of the experiment in Bettinger et al. (2020) with the machine learning
techniques described in Appendix B. As such, we can estimate treatment effects
controlling flexibly for predicted returns, and document that financial worries re-
open the SES investment gap even for parents with the highest predicted returns
– those for whom it is much easier to claim that the investing is optimal, given
the large expected earnings differential of graduating high-school in Brazil (see
Appendix B.B2.
Table E1 shows that our results are robust to controlling flexibly for an alter-
native version of predicted returns, computed within a different sub-sample of
parents in Bettinger et al. (2020) (see Appendix B.B3). Column (1) shows that
the prior experience increases the probability of investment by 20.5 p.p., whereas
priming financial worries reduces the likelihood by 13.4 p.p. (significant at 5%
level) among those parents. Columns (2) and (3) report that, among those with
prior experience, priming financial worries only impacts low-SES parents (signifi-
cant at 5% level); we reject the hypothesis that the impact of priming is identical
for low-SES and high-SES parents at 10% significance level. Column (4) shows
that the results are robust to allowing priming effects to vary with this alterna-
tive version of predicted returns. Column (5) of the table estimates the impact
of informing parents about the program’s effects on the probability of investing
in it. Among those with prior experience with the SMS program, information
about the impact reduced the likelihood of investing by 17.7 p.p. (significant at
1% level). Column (6) reports the results of the full interaction model; we fail to
reject the hypothesis that the effect of the priming and that of information are
statistically identical (p=0.463).
Table E2 shows that the effect size of financial worries on the likelihood of
investment among those with prior experience with the program not only remains
very large as we restrict attention to parents above the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentiles of predicted returns, but also, remains largely stable and precisely












Table E1—Effects of prior experience and priming on willingness to invest, alternative predicted returns of the SMS
program
Information = 0 Priming = 0 Full Sample
Overall Low-SES High-SES Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prior experience 0.205*** 0.217*** 0.050 0.205*** 0.209*** 0.208***
(0.0429) (0.0456) (0.1317) (0.0430) (0.0425) (0.0424)
Priming x Prior experience -0.134** -0.161** 0.158 -0.123* -0.135**
(0.0609) (0.0650) (0.1828) (0.0635) (0.0603)
Priming 0.056 0.071 -0.137 0.047 0.056
(0.0461) (0.0491) (0.1415) (0.0492) (0.0456)
Priming x Prior experience x Predicted returns -0.944
(1.5756)
Priming x Predicted returns 0.739
(1.4438)




Priming x Prior experience x Information 0.217**
(0.0872)
Priming x Information -0.099
(0.0666)
p-value(Info x Prior exp. [low-SES = high-SES]) 0.092
p-value([Info x Prior exp.] = [Priming x Prior exp.]) 0.463
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted returns (cubic polynomial) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.329 0.310 0.481 0.329 0.329 0.329
Observations 1080 938 142 1080 1059 2082
R-Squared 0.026 0.030 0.064 0.027 0.038 0.023
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with dependent variable = 1 if the subject chose to exchange R$ 10 in airtime credit for 6
months of the SMS program, and 0 otherwise. Prior experience = 1 if the subject was randomly assigned to the SMS program in the
previous RCT, and 0 otherwise. Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial worries, and 0 otherwise. Child-specific predicted
effects on graduation rates generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using machine learning techniques. Controls
include student’s race, age and gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table E2—Effects of prior experience and priming on willingness to invest, by
predicted returns of the SMS program
Information = 0
r>0% r>0.04% r>1.1% r>2.8%
(p25) (p50) (p75)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior experience 0.176*** 0.219*** 0.286*** 0.350***
(0.0422) (0.0482) (0.0588) (0.0822)
Priming x Prior experience -0.112* -0.150** -0.219*** -0.294**
(0.0601) (0.0684) (0.0836) (0.1163)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group mean 0.335 0.107 0.139 0.336
Observations 1106 854 569 294
R-Squared 0.020 0.029 0.050 0.083
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions with dependent variable = 1 if
the subject chose to exchange R$ 10 in airtime credit for 6 months of
the SMS program, and 0 otherwise. Prior experience = 1 if the subject
was randomly assigned to the SMS program in the previous RCT, and
0 otherwise. Priming = 1 if subject was primed about financial worries,
and 0 otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates (r)
generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using ma-
chine learning techniques. Controls include student’s race, age and gender,
and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Online Appendix F - Performance in Incentivized Cognitive Tests
Our phone survey includes incentivized cognitive tests, following Lichand and
Mani (2020). The cognitive outcomes we measure comprise tasks aimed at as-
sessing attention, together with working memory and impulse control (so called
brain’s executive functions; Diamond, 2013). We measure attention and working
memory through digit span tests, in which subjects must remember as many dig-
its as they can from the strings they hear (the more digits accurately recalled,
the higher the score). We measure attention and impulse control through Stroop
tests, in which subjects must answer the number of times they heard a particular
digit repeated in a sequence. While it is tempting to press the digit that one has
just heard repeated multiple times, the correct answer is never the digit itself.
See Appendix A for the full script of the cognitive tests in our phone survey.
For each cognitive test j, we estimate the following equation:
(F1) Y ji = α+ βjPrimingi +
∑
γkXk,i + εi
In equation F1, in the case of digit span, Y ji is given by the share of accurately
recalled digits, across all versions of the test; in the case of Stroop, Y ji is given by
the share of correctly identified number of repetitions, across all versions of the
test; Primingi=1 if caregiver i is primed about financial worries, and 0 otherwise;
Xi is a vector of student and family characteristics, and εi is an error term.
Since we conduct a multiplicity of tests, estimating separate regressions for each
outcome would substantially inflate the probability of false positives above stated
significance levels. For this reason, we build summary measures for each set of
outcomes and for cognitive load, following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). To
do that, we first normalize all outcomes to z-scores. Second, we run seemingly un-
related regressions (SUR) to compute an effect size β̂ for each summary measure,






In equation F2, β̂j are the point estimates obtained for ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions of Yj on a particular treatment variable, σ̂c,j is the variance
of that outcome for the control group, and K is the number of outcomes in that
category. We use bootstrapping to obtain standard errors for β̂.
In Lichand and Mani (2020), priming subjects about financial worries dete-
riorates cognitive performance on average, but effects are highly heterogeneous
according to municipality’s per capita income. Among the poorest municipalities,
the priming strongly worsens performance in attention, memory and impulse con-
trol tests, whereas in richest municipalities (with per capita income levels close
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to that of São Paulo State), it actually generates a cognitive bonus: the opportu-
nity for short-term gains actually significantly improves performance incentivizes
cognitive tests. As such, we are interested in whether β ≥ 0, consistent with
poverty-induced reallocation of mental bandwidth.
Table F1 estimates the effect of the priming on cognitive outcomes. Column (1)
regresses the summary measure on the priming indicator; column (2) adds stu-
dents’ and caregivers’ characteristics and controls flexibly for predicted returns;
column (3) adds the interaction of priming with an indicator of high socioeco-
nomic status; and columns (4) and (5) turn to the components of the cognitive
performance summary measure: digit span and Stroop, respectively.
Results confirm that, consistent with the mental bandwidth reallocation, exper-
imentally poor subjects perform significantly better in those tests: the priming
improves cognitive performance (measured by the summary measure) by over 0.08
standard deviation – about 1/3 of the correlation between cognitive performance
and college education in our sample. Effects are precisely estimated, statistically
significant at the 5% level (column 1) and are robust to controlling for students’
and their caregivers’ characteristics and child-specific predicted returns of the
SMS program (column 2). Column (3) documents that effects are concentrated
on low-SES parents (effects are smaller and no longer statistically significant for
high-SES parents, p=0.627). Last, columns (4) and (5) document that effects are
not driven by any specific component of the summary measure; financial worries
improve cognitive performance in face of small but immediate rewards in both













Summary measure Digit span Stroop
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Priming 0.082** 0.077** 0.080** 0.079* 0.092**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.0480) (0.0454)




p-value([Priming] + [Priming x High-SES] = 0) 0.627
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Predicted returns (cubic polynomial) No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1729 1700 1700 1700 1933
R-Squared 0.002 0.027 0.030 0.029 0.020
Notes: Columns (1) to (3) are Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), with the summary
measure of cognitive performance as dependent variable. Columns (4) and (5) are OLS
regressions with the components of the summary measure as dependent variables (digit span
and Stroop, respectively). Priming = 1 if the subject was primed about financial worries,
and 0 otherwise. High-SES = 1 if the subject completed higher education, and 0 otherwise.
Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s
experimental results, using machine learning techniques. Controls include student’s race,
age and gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Online Appendix G - Additional Figures
This Appendix compiles additional figures. Figure G1 showcases the SES in-
vestment gap: high-SES parents are more likely to invest in the SMS program
than low-SES parents across all levels of its predicted returns. Next, Figure G2
documents that prior experience with the SMS program increases willingness to
invest – and, in fact, even increases demand’s slope with respect to the program’s
predicted returns, relative to the control group. Last, Figures G3 and G4 show
that both priming financial worries and informing parents about the (small) ef-
fects of the SMS program on attendance in math classes reduces their willingness
to invest, relative to the control group.
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Figure G1. Investment decision by SES
Notes: Binscatter plots of subjects’ investment decisions as a function of
child-specific predicted returns, separately for low-SES subjects (left panel) and
high-SES ones (right panel). Investment = 1 if the subject chose to exchange R$
10 in airtime credit for 6 months of the SMS program and 0 otherwise.
Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates generated from Bettinger
et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using machine learning techniques.
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Figure G2. Effects of prior experience
Notes: Binscatter plots of subjects’ investment decisions as a function of
child-specific predicted returns, separately for subjects with no prior experience
with the SMS program (left panel) and those with prior experience (right
panel). Prior experience = 1 if the subject was randomly assigned to the SMS
program in the previous RCT, and 0 otherwise. Investment = 1 if the subject
chose to exchange R$ 10 in airtime credit for 6 months of the SMS program and
0 otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates generated from
Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using machine learning
techniques. Both variables residualized with respect to student’s race, age and
gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling.
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Figure G3. Effects of financial worries
Notes: Binscatter plots of subjects’ investment decisions as a function of
child-specific predicted returns, separately for subjects not primed about
financial worries (left panel) and those primed (right panel). Priming = 1 if
subject was in the treatment group of the survey experiment, and 0 otherwise.
Investment = 1 if the subject chose to exchange R$ 10 in airtime credit for 6
months of the SMS program and 0 otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on
graduation rates generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results,
using machine learning techniques. Both variables residualized with respect to
student’s race, age and gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income and
schooling.
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Figure G4. Effects of informing parents about child-specific effects on attendance
Notes: Binscatter plots of subjects’ investment decisions as a function of
child-specific predicted returns, separately for subjects not informed about the
effects of the program (left panel) and those informed (right panel). Information
= 1 if the subject was informed over text message about child-specific predicted
effects of the SMS program on attendance, and 0 otherwise. Investment = 1 if
the subject chose to exchange R$ 10 in airtime credit for 6 months of the SMS
program and 0 otherwise. Child-specific predicted effects on graduation rates
generated from Bettinger et al. (2020)’s experimental results, using machine
learning techniques. Both variables residualized with respect to student’s race,
age and gender, and their caregiver’s race, age, income and schooling.
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Online Appendix H - Early Version of Pre-Analysis Plan
Only an early version of the pre-analysis plan was registered at the AEA Social
Science Registry as AEARCTR-0001380, on June 26, 2016. It is presented in
full in subsection H.H2. Before that, subsection H.H1 highlights the elements of
the analyses that deviate from what had been specified in that early pre-analysis
plan.
H1. Deviations from early pre-analysis plan
We had pre-registered the experimental design at the same time as the one in
Bettinger et al. (2020), as we thought at the time the two would be conducted
simultaneously. As such, an important distinction from our analysis to that early
version of the pre-analysis plan is that the latter did not set out to investigate
demand for the SMS program as a function of predicted returns (since those would
not have been available at that time).
Over the course of 2016, when the prior experience experiment was taking place,
we only piloted the survey and information experiments analyzed in this paper,
and concluded several changes were in order before the experiments could be
rolled out in 2017. Besides the issue of predicted returns – crucial for establishing
whether differences in investment patterns induced by the priming are indeed
inefficient –, we modified these experiments in the following ways.
When it comes to the survey experiment, the early version of the pre-analysis
envisioned different versions of the priming and control messages at the begin-
ning of the phone call. Two arms were linked to small vs. large shocks related to
education expenses (the ones that were ultimately kept through the main exper-
iment). There was an additional arm in which the priming was linked to a large
shock unrelated to education, to assess whether it mattered that the shock and
the investment were both within the same domain. The problem is that the shock
we chose to use – a thought experiment in which the household’s fridge had to be
repaired – failed the manipulation test: financial worries did not increase nearly
as much in response to that priming in the pilot. For this reason, we removed
that variation from the main experiment. We also piloted a different version of
the control condition: a thought experiment in which there was a lasting unan-
ticipated cut in the household’s water supply, a large shock unrelated to financial
worries. Using that arm as a control condition seemed to yield similar results as
using the small shock in the pilot; for that reason, we kept only the latter in the
main experiment to maximize statistical power of the comparison and to keep it
in line with the typical approach in prior studies.
In the information experiment, we had envisioned that it would be also included
as part of the phone survey, by framing the investment in alternative ways: in
the control condition, we would merely state that the SMS program is “good for
your child”, while in the treatment condition, that it has the potential to “in-
crease future wages”. The pilot suggested, however, that mentioning wages just
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before the investment decision was also priming subjects about financial worries,
conflating the two experiments. That led us to switch to implementing the infor-
mation experiment through text messages, 2 days before the phone survey. What
is more, since in 2017 we could compute child-specific predicted returns, we used
those predictions to inform parents in the treatment group, while for the control
group we stated how many parents participated in the program in the previous
year.
Last, we did not pre-specify that we would use college education to contrast
high- vs. low-SES parents in our experiments. In 2016, it was hard to anticipate
whether we would be able to contact enough high-SES parents in order to draw
those comparisons with sufficient statistical power. Having said that, our results
for the effects of the priming on investment decisions hold even on average, and
we use our SES proxy to shed additional light on the psychological mechanisms
at play.
H2. Early pre-analysis plan
Background
A growing body of evidence suggests that parents play a crucial role in shaping
their children’s behavior and performance in school (Houtenville and Conway,
2008; Nye, Turner and Schwartz, 2006; Barnard, 2004; Fan and Chen, 2001). In
fact, differences in parental inputs are viewed as an important cause of intergener-
ational inequality (Becker and Tomes, 1979). This paper studies how poverty may
impose a psychological tax on parenting, generating a poverty trap even on the
absence of binding credit constraints for educational investments. There is reason
to think that this may be the case. While low-cost interventions have been shown
to significantly increase parental engagement and students’ outcomes (Kraft and
Rogers, 2015; York and Loeb, 2014), such interventions tend to have significantly
lower or no effects among minorities (black families in Chicago, in Fryer et al.,
2015, and Chinese families in San Francisco, in York and Loeb, 2014). One hy-
pothesis for why that might be comes from the cognitive load/mental bandwidth
theory Mullainathan and Shafir (2013): such parents might have less attention,
memory and impulse control available to parenting, because poverty generates
cognitive load (Mani et al., 2013; Lichand and Mani, 2020).
To test whether poor parents have a lower propensity to invest in their children
due to cognitive load, we resort to survey experiments, priming some parents –
but not others – about money, and then presenting them with the opportunity
to undertake a costly educational investment in their child. The hypothesis of
interest is whether those who are primed undertake such investment to a lesser
extent.
Such empirical strategy raises three main concerns. First, if there is an effect,
how do we know that it is driven by cognitive load, rather than just by a negative
mental state following the arrival of bad news (Lerner et al., 2015)? Second, the
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fact that the investment is costly may confound the effect of cognitive load with
that of credit constraints. And third, if the decision is hypothetical, then it is
hard to get a sense of whether it matters quantitatively.
To deal with the first concern, we randomly assign sub-samples of the subject
pool to other sources of negative news: either a monetary shock of much lower
magnitude, or a non-monetary shock. Moreover, we also try to delve more deeply
into the mechanism, by varying the source of the large monetary shocks – either
related or unrelated to educational expenses –, to address the possibility of mental
accounting (Thaler, 1999).
To deal with the second concern, we create a decision that involves opportunity
costs, but which does not require cash on hand. Specifically, we offer parents
the choice between a free educational product for a longer period, or the same
product for a shorter period coupled with an immediate top up in airtime credit.
The idea is that if those who are primed about money choose the short-length
plan, it cannot be because they were credit constrained to choose the longer-length
one.
To deal with the third concern, we present parents with a decision about a real
product. We offer enrollment in an SMS campaign that delivers content to support
parenting, an increasingly popular intervention to foster parental engagement
(York and Loeb, 2014), for either 2.5 or 5 months of the school year. Beyond
having real consequences, we can actually measure the impact of parents’ decisions
on their children’s education outcomes – attendance, grades and drop-out rates
–. The psychological impact of poverty on those outcomes is then estimated by
using priming status as an instrumental variable for parents’ decisions between
shorter- or longer-length plans.
Last, we also offer parents a savings technology, presenting all subjects with
the trade-off between receiving an immediate 5-dollar airtime credit top-up for
answering the survey, or a 10-dollar top-up one month later instead. Estimating
the effects of the priming on subjects’ discount rate provides us yet another way
to benchmark priming’s effect size on that educational decision.
While the cognitive load/mental bandwidth theory predicts that poverty might
impose a psychological tax on poor parents’ cognition, it also predicts that the
poor should perform relatively better in tasks framed in monetary terms (Shah,
Shafir and Mullainathan, 2015; Lichand and Mani, 2020). By precisely exploit-
ing this mechanism, interventions to foster parental engagement among the poor
might be improved by framing communication in monetary terms.
This paper also tests this hypothesis, by cross-randomizing how the educational
investment is presented for parents (framed as either “good for your child” or
“with potential to increase future wages”). We test whether the monetary framing
increases uptake of the longer-length plan, particularly for the subjects primed
about money.
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Intervention and sample
Survey experiments are randomly assigned at student levels, within a sample
of 60 Brazilian public schools, in order to estimate the psychological impacts of
poverty on educational investments. Using phone surveys, at the beginning of
each call we randomly assign parents to one out of four possible questions, asking
subjects to think about the consequences of: (i) a small monetary shock (a USD 10
unanticipated expenditure with a broken fridge; the control condition), (ii) a large
monetary shock unrelated to education (a USD 100 unanticipated expenditure
with a broken fridge), (iii) a large monetary shock related to education (a USD 100
unanticipated expenditure with school uniform and materials), and (iv) a large
non-monetary shock (a unanticipated 7-week stop in water supply; the placebo
condition). Following that, we offer parents the opportunity to undertake an
educational investment, by choosing the length during which they will be enrolled
in an SMS campaign that delivers content to support parenting (at no cost).
Subjects must decide between 2.5-months enrollment coupled with an immediate
airtime credit top-up of 5 dollars, or 5-months enrollment with no top-up. We
cross-randomize how the educational investment is presented for parents (framed
as either “good for your child” or “with potential to increase future wages”).
Table - Research Design
Table H1—Research Design
Non-monetary framing Monetary framing
Small monetary stock 625 parents 625 parents
Large monetary shock unrelated to
education
625 parents 625 parents
Large monetary shock related to
education
625 parents 625 parents
Large non-monetary shock 625 parents 625 parents
Outcomes
The key outcome of interest is parents’ decision to undertake or not the educa-
tional investment, which we will collect through the same IVR at which we run
the survey experiments. At the end of the intervention, the São Paulo Secretariat
of Education will provide data on student attendance and grades in 2016 (per
quarter), and enrollment in 2017. Moreover, the Secretariat implements annually
a standardized test to all schools in the state of São Paulo, SARESP (System of
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School Performance Evaluation of the State of São Paulo). All students in grades
1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 9th of primary school and the final year of high school are
tested on their knowledge of Mathematics and Portuguese.
Timeline & Milestones
Table H2—Timeline and Milestones
# Milestone Target Start Date Target End Date
1. Meeting with the Regional Board of Educa-
tion Directors and the São Paulo Secretariat
of Education to explain the project
Apr-14 Apr-14
2. Regional Board of Education Directors meet
with their schools principals to explain the
project
Apr-18 Apr-27
3. Schools register to participate in the program
(trough an online form)
Apr-18 Apr-27
4. Meeting with Education Directors and school
principals in each of the 5 Regional Board of
Education head office to explain the project
and distribute the enrollment material
May-9 May-17
5. Schools organize meeting with parents to ex-
plain the project and obtain their cellphone
and consent
May-10 May-30
6. Teacher uploads parental enrollment informa-
tion through secure website
May-10 June-2
7. Randomization June-3 June-5
9. Baseline phone survey implementation June-6 June-13
10. SMS content and nudges begin June-14 -
11. End line phone surveys implementation Dec-12 Dec-20
12. SMS content and nudges end Dec-20 -
13. Impact Evaluation Jan-30 Mar-31
